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Insider Trading and the Law Professors
Henry G. Manne*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Insider Trading and the Stock Market' appeared in
November, 1966, I was fully prepared for a goodly amount of
disagreement. I was not prepared however for the emotional, almost
hostile response my book received from some members of the academic
community.2 This is not to say that all the reviews by law professors
were unsympathetic and emotional in tone. Indeed the majority of them
were not, and while critical reviews outnumbered favorable ones, most
were in some degree mixed, and the tone was generally scholarly,
impersonal, and in many cases constructive But the response to my
book in the academic community outside of law schools has been more
gratifying personally. Unfortunately this response cannot be objectively
measured in terms of the number of pro and con book reviews, but with
a number of economists of high academic standing my book is taken
as an original contribution to the analysis of an important but
heretofore almost unexamined area.4
* William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law and Political Science, Department of Political
Science, University of Rochester; B.A. 1950, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1952, University of
Chicago Law School; LL.M. 1953, and S.J.D. 1966, Yale Law School.
i. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) [hereinafter cited as
ITSM].
2. See Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 720;
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53
VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967). For other reviews by law professors, see Baum, Book Review, 1967
DUKE L.J. 456; Jennings, Book Review, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1229 (1967); Kripke, Book Review,
42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 212 (1967); Marsh, Book Review, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1317 (1968); Painter,
Book Review, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 146 (1966). For reviews in law journals by nonlaw
professors, see Garrett, Book Review, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 465 (1968); Poser, Book Review,
53 VA. L. REV. 753 (1967); Sommer, Book Review, 54 A.B.A.J. 692 (1968); Tunks, Book Review,
10 S. TEX. L.J. 179 (1968); Vogt, Book Review, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 520 (1967); Weston, Book
Review, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 140 (1966); Wright, Book Review, 21 Sw. L.J. 405 (1967). See
also CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 714-15 (4th ed. 1969). The present article
will also consider Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 470 (1969) (an article review of my book by a professor of finance).
3. 1 would mention specifically Professors Baum, Cary, Hetherington, and Painter for
doing me the courtesy, not always displayed by others, of carefully reading and trying to
understand my book and for appreciating the spirit in which it was offered.
4. See, e.g., Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES I (H. Manne ed. 1969);
Benston, The Effectiveness and the Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements,
id. at 23; Williamson, Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, id. at 281.
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Some disparity of reaction between economists and lawyers is not
too surprising. The book was written largely as an exegesis into
economics, although the subject was of primary interest to lawyers. I
claim only amateur expertise in economics, but no more than that is
needed to let one conclude that the reviews of my book by certain law
professors displayed an abysmal ignorance of the principles of market
economics, principles which are of utmost importance if the complex
subject of stock market information is to be understood and
appropriately treated in the law. Many reviewers assumed the matter
to be one simply of'political doctrine or one to be resolved solely as
an ethical or normative matter. But this is not the case. The debatable
aspects of insider trading are capable of resolution through tools of
economic analysis. The "discovery" of ethical and moral issues and a
recurrent insistence on this approach strike me more as an outgrowth
of frustration than of cogent analysis.
Another aspect of my critics' work. is far more disturbing than
their lack of sophistication about economic concepts. Many professors
teaching securities law today have worked within the Securities and
Exchange Commission. With these, and with others perhaps trained in
the same point of view, there regularly appears a firm and unwaivering
conviction that what the SEC says is right. The desirability of securities
regulation is assumed almost as a matter of faith. For 35 years hardly
a law professor in the United States wrote a piece really critical of the
SEC, nor had anyone ever carefully analyzed the fundamental
economic premises on which the Commission operates.5 That is what
I attempted to do, and what was uncovered was a fierce loyalty to a
Government agency and its totally unexamined "philosophy."
This is unseemly behavior for academics. If they have a single
great responsibility beyond teaching it is to be loyal, competent, and
objective critics of the establishment. Political partisanship is more
destructive of honest academic endeavor than is anything else. This
5. There were naturally hundreds of lawyer-like pieces praising the cases or splitting
legislative hairs with great skill and intelligence, even though the general tone of the great mass
of legal literature in this field has been of the "how-to-do-it" variety. See ABA SECTION Or
CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
(1968). The first truly'critical analysis was Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets,
37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). This piece, by an eminent economist, critical of the SEC, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
occasioned cries of anguish from a somewhat coddled bureaucracy not used to criticism,
Subsequent to the special study and the' debate spawned thereby, only "law reform" type
materials have been significant. See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1340 (1966). For an indication that future reform is in the hands of the old guard, see Loss, The
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969).
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problem, of course, goes much deeper than the narrow specialty of
SEC regulation. It is at the base of much of the ambiguity surrounding
the position of a law school as part of a university.' Forty years of legal
realism and neo-realism have not been sufficient to make law
professors as comfortable with other academians as they are with other
lawyers.
With that introduction, or spleen-venting, as the case may be, I
should like to turn to what I consider the major errors in my critics'
reviews. I have selected only what I consider the more important and
basic of these ideas. In the course of these various discussions, I shall
also offer some new arguments which did not appear in my book, and
I will discuss evidence which has appeared since my book, all of which
seems strongly to substantiate my thesis. If I were writing the book
now for the first time, I should certainly emphasize different points
than I did initially. But the basic thesis has weathered the storm of
complaint with considerably more vigor and utility than I anticipated
for such a complex and fundamental new model of our securities
markets.
II. MORALS, MORALS, MORALS
Morals, someone once said, are a private luxury. Carried into the
arena of serious debate on public policy, moral arguments are
frequently either sham or a refuge for the intellectually bankrupt. Just
because the phrase "insider trading" raises a spector of dishonesty,
fraud, exploitation, and greed is not sufficient basis for assuming that
the fact must be so or that the practice must, ipso facto, be outlawed.
Yet one of the leading academic figures in the field of securities
regulation stated to me personally, "We didn't need any book on
insider trading. I know it's wrong, and that's all there is to it." As
far as I know, however, no one has adduced actual evidence that this
person is God.
For some writers the moral argument seemed to be substantiated
simply by changing the terminology. To this group, insider trading
must be outlawed because the information is the "property" of the
shareholders.7 These victims of acute formalism establish themselves
one rung below the divinity of the last paragraph. They are content
6. Cf. Goldstein, The Unfulfilled Promise of Legal Education, in LAW IN A CHANGING
AMERICA 157 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
7. Professor Jennings, for instance, clearly illustrates this fallacy when he states that inside
information is not the property of the insiders, "but fairly belongs to all of the shareholders."
Jennings, supra note 2, at 1234.
1970]
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merely to conclude that they are law givers. For them the ukase that
the information does not belong to the insider but rather is the property
of the shareholders seems to satisfy all demands of logic.8
One is certainly tempted to suggest that by now intelligent lawyers
would realize the emptiness of that position. They should recognize that
the concept of property is no more nor less than the rights and
obligations recognized by law9 and that the statement above neither
proves nor disproves a thing. But the statement was not only vacuous;
as a legal matter, it was also erroneous. As I stated numerous times
in my book, the question at issue was how the law should develop after
the date of writing.' At that time the Texas Gulf Sulphur case" had
not been decided in the district court, and it just could not be said with
the serene confidence evinced in, a number of reviews, that the
information "belonged" to the shareholders. And why the
shareholders? How about an insider selling to an outsider when the
insider has knowledge of an earnings decline? Is that knowledge to be
considered the "property" of the outsider? The argument is not worthy
of serious attention, and first year law students should always be taught
to be on guard against this fallacy.
To demonstrate just how artificial the morality and the property
arguments are, one need only consider other situations in which
information is used in a transaction to the benefit of the person who
has it. For instance a large corporation plans to establish an extensive
production facility in a new location. Typically, with all the secrecy of
the CIA planning an assassination, the company will send its agents
out to purchase land as discreetly as possible. The case law is clear that
unless the seller has been deceived, as for instance by being told that
there is no undisclosed principal,' 2 the transaction is a perfectly valid
one.13 And I do not know of any commentator who has ever classified
this as immoral conduct.
So notice the irony: TGS officials buying stock with knowledge
of a new ore vein have somehow done something immoral, but the
company itself buying surrounding land, utilizing precisely the same
8. It should be clear, moreover, that the lawyers making this argument were not merely
offering it as a statement of law but, perhaps more important, as a reason why insider trading
should not be allowed. The circularity of this approach should be readily apparent.
9. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.i. 733, 739 (1964).
10. ITSM, supra note I, at 33-46.
11. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 302 (1957).
13. Id. § 304.
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information, has merely performed in a business-like fashion. 4 Nor
will it do, as one high official of the SEC tried, to distinguish these
two cases on the not-so-obviously pertinent ground that "after all, one
case involved land and the other securities."'" Lawyers especially, it
would seem, should be very circumspect about characterizing the
utilization of superior information as immoral. That is, after all, their
stock in trade.
III. HARM To OUTSIDERS
A. Tricks with time
Repeatedly, academic lawyers made one fundamental error in
economic analysis. The frequency of its appearance and the intensity
with which it is presented suggest that this view may play an important
psychological role in my critics' view of insider trading. The error, like
so many in economics, has a superficial plausibility which most people
never seem to get beyond. Almost at random one finds statements like,
"[I]f [the shareholder] should decide to sell, he sells at a lower price
than he would if the facts were known . . . . When the facts are
known, he cannot but regret having sold. 1 6 Of course an individual
with knowledge of forthcoming good news does not sell his shares; and
manifestly he would be better off if he had the information than if he
did not. Could anyone seriously think that I ever disagreed with that
14. This behavior was expressly condoned by the court of appeals in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
litigation and presumably by the SEC. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850
n.12 ("valuable corporate purpose was served by delaying the publication of the K-55-1
discovery").
15. This remark was made by David Ferber, Solicitor of the SEC in a panel discussion
during a symposium on federal and state securities regulation. Part of the panel discussion, not
including this remark, is reported in The Emergence of "Federal Corporation Law" and Federal
Control of Inside Information, 34 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 228 (1966).
16. Painter, supra note 2, at 149. See also Jennings, supra note 2, at 1232; Mendelson,
supra note 2, at 482; and Poser, supra note 2, at 754. Professor Schotland tried to delve deeply
into this subject, but his discussion of the impact of insider trading on outsiders is
incomprehensible to me. His principal error seems to result from his confusing the familiar "long-
term investor" with my "time-function trader." ITSM, supra note 1, at 95. In specific instances,
however, he turns around and confuses the long-term investor with the price-function trader. In
fact neither price nor time-function trading has anything necessarily to do with how long shares
have been held.
Schotland, supra note 2, at 1434, refers to trades being made "on the basis of time" and
"on the basis of price." But time-function trading is not trading which occurs because the shares
have been' held for a certain period of time. They are trades that occur at a specific time
independent of any change in the price of shares. See note 43, infra. It is difficult to understand
how anyQnewho read the book carefully could make this error, which incidentally is also made
by Mendelsoncsupra note 2, at 483.
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proposition? The fundamental premise of the entire book is that
information is a valuable good which will be sought after by human
beings who prefer more rather than less of anything good."7 It is
gratifying to note that my critics at least understand that shareholders
want valuable information, but they also seem to equate this simple
human wish for more with some legal or moral claim and to assume
that a denial of that wish constitutes an injury to those individuals.
The error, however, is not difficult to track down. To say that the
shareholder would not have sold if he had had the information, in
effect, switches the time of disclosure under the two rules. The critics
assure a situation, without insider trading, in which the news is
disclosed earlier than it is under the insider trading rule. That is, their
position assumes that without insider trading the time of public
disclosure will be the time at which the first insider would otherwise
have traded, while a rule permitting insider trading will result in public
disclosure after the insider has traded. 8 I believe that writers reached
this conclusion because of what Professor Demsetz has called the
"grass is always greener" fallacy derived from the "nirvana"
approach to economics." They are comparing the real, imperfect world
of insider trading to a never, never land of perfect solutions to all
problems, especially enforcement. They assume that a rule against
insider trading is the equivalent of a full and timely disclosure rule
perfectly enforced. Unfortunately, that would not be the case.
Enforcement will be imperfect at best, and there is certainly no
guarantee of early disclosure even with the complete absence of insider
trading. The only reasonable approach is to compare the financial
17. This statement holds, of course, only if all other conditions remain the same. For a
series of related economic postulates, see A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONONMIcs 14-
19 (2d ed. 1967).
18. Mendelson is quite insistent on making this error. He says we can only compare the
case without insider trading in which "the information had been made public from the
beginning." Mendelson, supra note 2, at 482. He does not explain why this is so.
19. Demetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. LAW & ECON. I, 2
(1969). This is a critique of Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962). "Given the nirvana view of the problem, a deduced discrepancy
between the ideal and the real is sufficient to call forth perfection by incantation, that is, by
committing the grass is always greener fallacy." Demsetz, supra at 3.
Mendelson also tries to argue that while my logic might hold for traders with absolutely no
knowledge, it is faulty for those with partial knowledge, such as mutual funds. But qf. Jensen,
The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964. 22 J. FIN. 389 (1968); Sharpe,
Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119 (1966) (both indicating, as have other studies,
including some by Professor Mendelson's colleagues, that the knowledge Mendelson posits does
not exist in mutual funds).
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status of the average outsider under the two different trading rules with
disclosure occurring at the same time in each case.
After that issue is settled, then one can turn logically to the
question of whether the trading rule affects the time of disclosure. If
indeed a rule against insider trading could be perfectly enforced, then,
with good news as indicated above, there would be no profit to the in-
siders and there would be a saving to those who would otherwise have
sold at a subsequent time. Again, nothing inconsistent with this propo-
sition appears in my book. But I naturally spent more time on the
more important and complex comparison of the situations with dis-
closure occurring at the same time.
B. The Economics of Partial Enforcement
Some authors explicitly argue that allowing insider trading delays
public disclosure .2  The superficially plausible explanation is that
insiders will need time to transmit knowledge to friends, assemble
needed financing, or otherwise arrange a large purchase of securities.
That such a propensity may exist cannot be denied, though there is
little reason to believe that this would normally take much time.
Contrariwise, it should be noted that insiders will usually be in a very
great hurry to use their information before others get it or before it
becomes worthless for unforeseen reasons. Thus they may have a
tremendous incentive to use it fast. And this is only a beginning, since
we cannot properly assess this issue in terms of the ideal of perfect
enforcement of a rule against insider trading.2' We live in a real world,
and unfortunately enforcement of a rule like that in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur decision is going to be partial at best. The matter has been
well argued by Professor Demsetz.
[l]t is not clear that attempts to discourage insider trading will shorten the time
between the acquisition of valuable market knowledge by the firm and its
revelation to shareholders and the general public. By increasing the cost of using
the direct and obvious methods of capturing some of the value of this information,
the SEC will encourage insiders to rely in greater degree on the less direct and
more time-consuming methods. The possible or probable result will be to lengthen
the time period during which insiders attempt to keep really valuable information
secret. Inside information that can be used profitably only if direct trading
20. See Mendelson, supra note 2, at 473, 489; Schotland, supra note 2, at 1448. If this
period were anything near as long as Mendelson implies (though his time-period implications vary
throughout his article), it is very doubtful that we could see a random walk in the stock market.
See notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of the economics of partial enforcement, see note 28 infra and
accompanying text.
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methods are used may become available sooner or later depending on whether
managers decide to reveal the knowledge or confine it to the next quarterly or
annual report.P
Interestingly a number of aspects of the insider trading debate turn
on the efficiency with which a rule against such trading can be
enforced. This is a point which I discussed at length in my book23 and
have developed further in subsequent writing.24 But with a sanguinity
worthy of safer bets, my critics assure their readers that the SEC
"good guys" always catch the "bad uns. ' 12 1 Professor Kripke thinks
that the facts of cases like Cady, Robert s are rare and that when they
occur they are apprehended.27 Perhaps no one whom Professor Kripke
knows is guilty of a violation of Rule lOb-5; nearly everyone I know
is. But the significant thing for present purposes is the failure of the
opponents of insider trading to comprehend the economic and political
effects of partial enforcement.
Enforcement of the rules, as well as the punishments to be meted
out, will of necessity be discretionary and discriminatory. There is no
way to avoid this. Decisions will have to be made about where the
limited enforcement resources can be spent; they will inevitably be spent
to oppose those least in favor with the Commission.
If we look at the great failures of liberal governments to maintain
their principles, it will readily be seen that a significant danger has been
laws which could not be or were not readily enforced against all
violators. The most obvious example from modern history is the
American experiment with prohibition. The breakdown of law began
because the potential payoff from illicit activities was extremely high
relative to the risk of apprehension and punishment. Effective
enforcement on a broad scale would have required unacceptable police
measures. Only partial enforcement was feasible. As a result a
cancerous corruption of law enforcement officials resulted from the
undoubtedly well-intended prohibition.
Political discretion in such government areas as zoning and
occupational licensing have likewise lent themselves to corruption of
22. Demsetz, supra note 4, at 14.
23. ITSM, supra note 1, at 159-69.
24. Manne, Prohibition on Wall Street?, Bafron's, Dec. 16, 1968, at S.
25. Jennings, supra note 2, at 1232; Schotland, supra note 2, at 1456-57. While Schotland
says enforcement is easy, he realizes that something that looks like insider trading regularly occurs
and that the SEC does nothing about it. This is blamed on a shortage of funds! Id. at 1474-75.
26. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).




governments and demoralization of communities. And the blackmail
and corruption potential of partially enforced rules against
prostitution, gambling, and narcotics are too well known to need
discussion.
The more decent, law abiding, and risk-averse members of the
financial community will not knowingly engage in insider trading if it
is a prohibited activity. They have the most to lose from apprehension
and are thus the most vulnerable to charges by the SEC. But the
scoundrels and those with little to lose-or perhaps just the very sharp
and clever operators-will quickly fill any gap. Thus the absence of
the more high-minded participants from a segment of the securities
field makes it that much more lucrative and attractive for those we
least want to encourage.
This phenomenon has been nicely described by Herbert Packer as
a "crime tariff. ' 2 8 A tariff, of course, puts imported goods at a
competitive disadvantage compared to domestic goods and to that
extent protects the domestic producer. Partial law enforcement,
similarly, gives a completely unwarranted competitive advantage to
those against whom the law is not enforced.
Historically, it seems that this created a vicious cycle. Those who
became richer by the illicit activity found it profitable to expend some
of their resources to corrupt government officials in order to preserve
their monopoly positions. That is, they try to guarantee enforcement
against competitors while preserving their own sanctuary. The Volstead
Act again affords the best-known illustration, though many more exist.
Selective and partial enforcement by the SEC of the whole gamut of
lOb-5 and related rules will in all likelihood result in some new group
of insiders growing wealthier and eventually constituting a vested
interest with strong influence over the very government regulatory
agency created to protect the public. There is no reason to believe that
individuals who can profit by partial enforcement of SEC rules against
insider trading will not try to do so.
C. Distributive Effects of Legal Rules
There would be real harm to outsiders if they were being deprived
of something that we could normally characterize as their "property."
That is, if there were an existing rule of law stating that all information
belongs to shareholders or would-be shareholders, then to change that
rule would be to deprive existing outsiders of something they had some
28. Packer, The Crime Tariff, 33 Am. SCHOLAR 551 (1964).
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right to continue to enjoy. It is extremely doubtful that any significant
part of the stock trading public assumed that any such rule existed. No
one has actually claimed so. And no matter how loudly the contrary
is shouted, at the time of the writing of my book there was no rule to
this effect .2  There were practices and warnings to be sure0  (many
people have noticed the pushy ways of federal regulatory agencies), but
no rule existed whose change I was advocating. While my critics may
claim that I am "seldom inclined to let facts interfere with theory,"'"
29. 1 certainly made it clear in my book that I was not referring to § 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 1 was at some pains to explain that I had no
great quarrel with that provision, since I did'not believe that it was effective to counter the most
significant form of insider trading, trading in a company's shares by an individual who has
reliable information from an inside source but who is not, within the meaning of § 16(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), an insider himself. This is what Louis Loss has referred to as "tippees."
I chose to use the more descriptive term for a trader with reliable information of "advisec." I
bow now to a superior word popularizer. At any rate it is inconceivable that any careful reader
of my book would not be aware that it was addressed to the problem posed by the pending
interpretation of Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
I did say about § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), that it might possibly serve to prevent
some manipulation in stocks by statutory insiders. Indeed this was the only real justification that
I could find for it since its official justification has almost no persuasive force, even among its
supporters. See L. Loss, SECURITiEs REGULATION 1042-43 (2d ed. 1961). As I stated, "Section
16(b) can be rationalized as an antimanipulation device but not as an effective prohibition of
insider trading ...
[N]either legislative history nor the subsequent literature on the Section has viewed Section
16 as another of the antimanipulation devices Congress included in the 1934 Act." ITSM, supra
note 1, at 30. Nonetheless Professor Jennings concluded that I claimed § 16(b), 15
U.S.C. § 7 8 p(b) (1964), was "mainly aimed" at preventing manipulation. Jennings, supra note
2, at 1230-31 n.3.
30. See Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271 (1965).
31. Jennings, supra note 2, at 1232. Professor Jennings has also erroneously alleged that I
would shrink from allowing insiders to sell information for cash. Jennings, supra note 2, at 1231.
This is simply incorrect. What I said was that "[a]lthough there are no cases directly on the point,
it is very likely that a court would hold the direct sale of insider information by an insider to be
a breach of fiduciary duty." ITSM, supra note 1, at 60. 1 then mentioned 2 legal analogies that
could be made and stated that I thought neither of them was analytically the same as a direct
sale of information. The point I was making was about the obtuseness of legalists, not about the
undesirability of selling information in an open market. Certainly if this right could be found as
an implicit or explicit part of a contract between an insider and his corporation, I would not
shrink from enforcing it.
In the same vein Professor Jennings, supra note 2, at 1233, wrongly asserts that I would
also fault the holding in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). But I would
view this case exclusively as a matter of defining an implicit contractual term. Had the matter
been explicitly provided for in the agreement, it should have been enforced as written. Clearly I
could not possibly have the same objection to that case that I have to Texas Gulf Sulphur.
While I am at it, I might just point out that Professor Jennings displays gross lack of
familiarity with economic concepts when he states that neither is the question of allocation of
resources pertinent-we don't allow stealing even though the thief may have a better economic
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the thing that emerges much more clearly is their total unwillingness
to allow either facts or theory to interfere with their wishes. Moral
fervor, whether held by fundamentalist ministers or by law brofessors,
is not easily shaken by rational argument. So much then for the
argument that shareholders are injured by insider trading because they
are losing a legal interest they have been led to believe was theirs.
The real analytical point at issue is the distributive effect of a rule
allowing insider trading as compared to the effect of a rule effectively
preventing it. There is of course some immediate distributive effect to
changing any legal rule on which persons have relied. But that is a
separate issue (and much less significant quantitatively) from that of
how a rule will effect different categories of persons forever in the
future. I spent at least two chapters in my book on this subject 2
Unfortunately, I must have confused several reviewers of the book.
Indeed, one confessed that, "[t]he reviewer (no economist or
mathematician he) could not cope with the purported mathematical
demonstration. '33 This confusion, however, did not deter him from
concluding that it was "apparent on the face of things that the author's
description of the stock market behavior of a stock uninfluenced by
insider trading conformed to nothing existing on earth. '34 This
sentence displays only his inability to comprehend a straightforward
abstract model of a market situation, and his little amusement of
having an anonymous mathematician look at the diagrams35 certainly
tells us far more about him than it does about my work. Why a
mathematician? Why not an artist to criticize the aesthetic value of my
drawings? The latter might have had more to offer.
use for the money. Jennings, supra note 2, at 1223. See the index of any good micro-economic
text to gain some feeling for my sense of frustration with this and similar views. See Mendelson,
supra note 2, at 470.
32. ITSM, supra note 1, at 77-110.
33. Kripke, supra note 2, at 213.
34. Id. This may take the prize as the most disingenuous statement in any of the reviews.
I somehow have the feeling that Professor Kripke joined a coterie of critics who tried to see who
could laugh the loudest at my work. He may or may not have realized that this was more a matter
of strategy than of serious critique. Professor Schotland reports that the former Chairman of the
SEC, Manual F. Cohen, had agreed to review the book and then "understandably" changed his
mind. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1425 n.2. SEC insiders, after an initial outburst of high-level
fury, apparently concluded that either silence or laughter would be the most effective device for
countering the effects of my insidious book. They were correct and, furthermore, this strategy
has not been unsuccessful. But, while I cannot say that I have enjoyed being chided in public as
a modern version of the village idiot, I believe there is evidence that my work is beginning to
have significant influence on thinking in this field. Why, even Professor Jennings has referred to
it as "the beginning of a counterrevolutionary effort." Henkel, Codification-Civil Liberty Under
the Federal Securities Law, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAw. 793, 882 (1967) (remarks of Richard W. Jennings).
35. Kripke, supra note 2, at 213.
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Several legal writers failed to comprehend that an economic
discussion may (indeed, often must) be offered in terms of the
performance of functions rather than in terms of real, identifiable
human beings 6 This, as we have seen, leads Schotland and others to
confuse my "time-function trader" with the "long-term investor" of
popular financial parlance3 Interestingly, Professor Schotland fails to
mention once, a matter that I, as opposed to he, consider basic to my
thesis. The crucial omission from this and other reviews is any mention
of the so-called random walk hypothesis of stock market price
movements, which is crucial to an understanding of this subject3 I
36. For a definition of functional analysis in economics, see A. ALCHIAN & W. Allen, supra
note 17, at 21-22.
37. See note 16 supra. The elaborations of this error in Schotland's article are too extensive
even to summarize. But I should like to repeat the point made in my book that the period of
time for which shares are held has absolutely no necessary relevance to the question of whether a
particular transaction is either a time-function or a price-function transaction. To repeat, the
price-function trader is one who buys or sells securities exclusively on the assumption that he has
received significant information from an observed price change, and time-function traders are
everyone else. Manifestly one may be a price-function seller of shares he has owned for 50 years,
and just as clearly one may be a time-function seller of shares he acquired yesterday. The error
was constantly made of relating my time-function trader to the familiar long-term investor. This
confusion completely skews the analysis since the price-function trader is making an assumption
that he has new irtformation about the company, while the time-function trader makes no
assumption about having new corporate information. He trades for reasons exogenous to the
market price of the shares.
38. Having missed a truly basic point, but sure that there is one, Schotand's error about
functions leads him to conclude that "the prevalence of such an 'induced effect' is one of the
basic assumptions of the Manne thesis." Schotland, supra note 2, at 1444. The reference is
presumably to the existence of price-function traders, that is, those who base buy or sell decisions
on changes in share prices caused by insiders' trading. I do not understand how Professor
Schotland concludes that the "prevalance" of this trading is one of the "basic assumptions" of
my thesis. The only reason such traders have any relevance for the discussion was to see whether
anyone was injured as a result of insider trading, and that analysis would not be changed in any
particular if no one traded on this basis since it would then be impossible to find a group injured
by this kind of trading. Indeed, the very significance of the discussion of the "random walk"
was that these traders do not have any real information. Consequently, their trades merely
supplement the random movement of stock prices.
This is one of so many misstatements of my thesis as to have left me completely bewildered
as to how to deal with this particular review. Time and temperament prevent my responding to
every error. I hope that independent persons may in the future study both works carefully in an
effort to straighten out my disagreements with Professor Schotland. Several economists to whom
I have shown his work find it so uninformed and error-ridden as not to warrant serious attention.
Less surprisingly perhaps, a Commissioner of the SEC has stated publicly that Professor
Schotland has destroyed my thesis.
Professor Schotland's article was presumably prepared during the summer of 1967 when he
enjoyed some sort of close and friendly relationship with the Securities and Exchange Commission
in Washington. There is internal evidence of this relationship during the time of writing. See
Schotland, supra note 2, at 1456-47 n.88. Professor Schotland quotes my statement that "rumors
of the Texas Gulf discovery had already reached flood proportions in Washington." "In fact,"
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referred the reader of my book to all the literature on the random walk
idea existing up until that time, and I tried to explain it in fairly
simplified terms to readers who might be unfamiliar with the concept 9
says Schotland, "the 'flood' was not even a good flow, but a mere irickle." Id. He then cites a
"reliable authority" to the effect that my statement was not true since "fewer than a dozen people
in Washington bought Texas Gulf shares in the period in question." Id. But I had stated nothing
about how many people in Washington actually bought shares, only what I had heard about the
TGS rumors. Also, what is the "period in question"? Did it start in November 1963 or March
1964 or some other time?
Professor Schotland, presumably according to the same reliable authority, goes on to state
that "[t]he SEC traced all the round-lot buying which originated in Washington, and even the
buying done in New York by New York residents known to have been phoned by relatives or
friends in Washington. Almost all of these purchases were traceable directly, or at one remove,
to tips from the site geologist." Id. (emphasis added). When Professor Schotland says that the
SEC traced all round-lot buying which originated in Washington, I presume that this means the
SEC traced all round-lot buying placed by brokers in Washington. But unless every transaction
in the stock were traced, the SEC could not know that Washingtonians were not utilizing non-
Washington brokers for this purpose. Indeed there is strong independent evidence that many
Washingtonians do their trading in that fashion. See Leaky Capital: Washington Attracts Many
Seeking to Profit from Inside Information, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 14, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
But the most disturbing thing about Schotland's disclosure is the apparent claim that the
SEC knows which New York residents purchasing Texas Gulf stock phoned or were phoned by
relatives or friends in Washington. Alternatively Schotland could be saying that the SEC traced
New York purchLses they were told about by Washington sources. Then, of course, the statement
would be of no significance whatever. It seems more likely that the former interpretation is
correct. But if that is so, how could the SEC have this information? They may have means of
which I am unaware, but it would seem necessary for them first to have the list of all individuals
in New York ordering Texas Gulf stock. That might be a fairly sizable job and still not reveal
the true beneficiaries of every transaction, but I will presume that the SEC did this. Then I
presume that it would be within their frightening power to check telephone company records of
Washington calls to and from these individuals. Of course, they might also find other interesting
information in this way, such as that certain officials in Washington were holding telephone
conversations with racketeers or that persons under investigation were in clandestine
communcation with judges or with the White House, congressmen, or other public officials. In
other words, the SEC; through Professor Schotland, now appears to admit the utilization of an
extraordinarily dangerous police state tactic in the interest of what at best is a minor moral
obsession. We hear regularly of the dangers of invasion of privacy from computer banks of
information and other technological methods. Well, the danger is here, and the worst may be
happening daily. Is it not ironic that my critics call me a conservative?
39. My attempt to introduce this material and explain its importance was evidently
overlooked by Professor Schotland when he stated that my book does not "cite or draw upon
any empirical studies to support its thesis, nor itself offer any new data." Schotland, supra note
2, at 1443 n.59. It is, of course, a favorite gambit of reviewers to criticize an author for not
writing the book they would like but also have not written. I must respectfully decline the gambit.
I had no intention of preparing a statistical study of insider trading, nor would I be qualified to
do so.
The clear implication of Professor Schotland's reference to my failure to cite empirical data
is that I was hiding evidence contrary to my thesis. See Schotland, supra note 2, at 1443 nn.59
& 60. 1 do not apologize for not finding unpublished theses, but one of the works cited by
Professor Schotland, that of Professor Wu, Corporate Insider Trading.in the Stock Market, 1957-
1961, 2 NAT'L BANK REv. 373 (1965), came to my attention when my book was in galley proof.
I concluded then that since Professor Wu had devoted himself exclusively to instances of insider
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Without going into great detail, readers should understand that the
existence of random walk in stock market pricing is generally taken by
economists as an indication that the market is functioning very
efficiently, 40 that is, that the market assimilates new information
quickly and accurately. Significant time lags in the assimilation of new
information would presumably show up as nonrandom movements. If
every outside purchaser or seller of securities confronts a random
walk-and it must be remembered that if the hypothesis is correct, this
condition will exist for every trader other than one who actually has
inside information-then for any given transaction he cannot know
whether he would benefit or be harmed by either of the rules on insider
trading. That is, he cannot know at point X whether he will be
benefited or harmed at point X + Y by a rule allowing insider trading
or by a rule forbidding it. By hypothesis, he has no basis for predicting
transactions reported under § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1964), his work was not actually relevant enough to my thesis to warrant the expense of changes
at that point. I had heard of the book by E. SMITH, MANAGEMENT TRADING: STOCK MARKET
PRICES AND PROFITS (1941), and that the same thing was true there, but I was unable to locate
that book in any library in Washington, D.C., including the Library of Congress. I did not try
to use the library at the SEC.
But none of the works cited by Schotland contained data of the sort that I "repeatedly
deplore the lack of." The data I requested, ITSM, supra note i, at 63, easily within the power
of the SEC to ascertain, would almost conclusively settle much of the controversy, since it would
have shown the amount of indirect insider trading. See note 44 infra. The second thing to note
about Professor Schotland's remarks is tlat he apparently read Professor Wu's findings quite
the opposite of what they are. Compare Schotland, supra note 2, at 1445, with Mendelson, supra
note 2, at 479.
The truth is that I was wrong about the propriety of Wu's and Smith's approach. I assumed,
that indirect insider trading was so tremendously important that no statistically significant
amount of direct trading by insiders in the stock of their companies would show up.
Since the publication of my book, the most scholarly and exacting study yet on the subject or
direct insider trading has appeared. See Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properites
of Insider Trading, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 35 (1968). Their conclusion is unmistakable and
convincing. "Insiders tend to buy more often than usual before large price increases and sell more
than usual before price decreases." Id. at 52. This study is actually a devastating blow to anyone
who wants to proclaim that insider trading has not regularly been occurring or that it does not
continue even now.
There are various other works as well which support this and other aspects of my total thesis,
though not quite so directly. See Mendelson, supra note 2, at 479 nn.21-23. See also note 43 infra.
But one of the more ironic must be mentioned now. Professor Wu, the very one Schotland most
relies upon, has, in a subsequent work, made the strongest plea since the appearance of my book
for allowing insider trading because it is economically beneficial. He concludes that "the arbitrary
short-term trading restrictions provided by Section 16(b) and the recent vigorous attempt of the
SEC to apply Rule lOb-5 to insider trading may be harmful to the economy." Vu, An Economist
Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUIM. L. REV. 260, 269 (1968).
40. E.g., Samuelson, Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS.
MGT. REV. 41 (2d pt. 1965). See also Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets,
and "Martingale" Models. 39 J. Bus. 242 (1966).
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in advance (without information, as he is) what his ex post position
would be. Since he cannot know what these two positions would be in
advance, he has no way of comparing one to the other.!'
My critics should realize, however, that the existence of a random
walk does not necessarily militate against the view that no insider
trading is occurring. Indeed, if there were instantaneous recognition of
new information by all participants in the market, as would be the
effect of perfect enforcement of a rule requiring timely disclosure and
no insider trading, a random walk would still appear 2
I take the random walk as support for my proposition because I
cannot conceive of information being disclosed and assimilated that
perfectly by a broad spectrum of investors in the market. I believe that
the random walk is better explained by the existence of large scale
insider trading than it is by the general absence of this practice.43
41. Consider a bettor at the race track who looks over the odds and sees Romper Roy at
10 to 1. We can assume that those are correct odds in the sense of accurately measuring the
probability of Romper Roy's winning. If this is the case, it makes no difference to the bettor
that someone else actually knows that Romper Roy ran his early morning test mile in record
time and has a better than usual chance of winning today, even though the odds are correct at
10 to 1. Presumably the odds, like the stock price, will at race time reflect all information known
about the horse. If the morning workout had been skipped, the odds might or might not be 10
to I now, but we cannot say that a casual bettor is better or worse off because someone else in
fact knows the information. Rossett, Gambling and Rationality, 73 J. POL. ECON. 595 (1965)
(an important article with perhaps more significance for the insider trading question than would
appear at first glance).
Part of the confusion probably results from the different frames of reference of the economist
and the lawyer. When I say that no individual trader faced with the random walk can predict
his future position under the different insider trading rules, I refer to one individual taken as
representative of the entire class of all traders. It would not be fair for instance to pick out the
single individual who by happenstance would be the one selling to an insider with undisclosed good
news. Accord, Loss, The American Law Institute Federal Securities Law Project. 25 Bus. LAW.
27, 35 (1969); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1377 (1965). Now it is true that
one individual or more must occupy that position, but in advance no one can know who that is,
and an individual would certainly be foolish to stay out of the market because insider trading
was allowed, or to enter it because it was forbidden.
42. See note 40 supra.
43. See Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information,
10 INr'L ECON. REV. 1, 20 (1969), where the authors conclude that the stock market is so efficient
in reflecting new information that no one without inside information could benefit from almost
immediate purchases of stock upon announcement of a stock split (which is followed by higher
subsequent dividends per share). We can choose one of two explanations for this efficiency. Either
the market, through public disclosure (or magic), instantaneously reflects the new value, or
insiders are causing the price change. Which explanation would you choose? Other studies are
equally convincing on this matter of the stock market's phenomenal efficiency in reflecting new
information. Since it is very doubtful that much of this is caused by direct insider trading, my
hypothesis about a market for information and indirect insider trading seems strongly
substantiated. The best current summary will be found in Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
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IV. EXISTENTIAL MYSTERIES OF INSIDER TRADING
When I wrote Insider Trading and the Stock Market, I believed
that the SEC was probably fairly efficient in preventing any direct
insider trading. Certainly the requirement that direct trading in his own
company's shares by an officer, director, or ten percent shareholder be
reported under 16(a), plus the sanction of 16(b), would effectively
discourage most of this obvious kind of insider trading. And yet, the
first significant study of this phenomenon indicates beyond any doubt
that a significant amount of direct insider trading continues to the very
present, though presumably without a purchase and sale occurring
within six months of each other.44
At this point I should like to deal with another common error in
my critics' reviews. Repeatedly, they become confused about how I was
using the word "insiders." I tried to make it clear that I was referring
to any trading by any individual based on information which had not
yet been publicly disclosed or completely exploited by other traders."
I did not intend to qualify the term in the usual ways that lawyers
might think of. I certainly did not limit my definition to officers,
directors, and ten percent shareholders," nor did it make any difference
in my view whether the individual who ultimately traded knew what the
facts were or merely traded on the basis of informed advice which he
trusted.4 7 I spent an entire chapter discussing various methods by which
the value of information could be transferred without an actual transfer
of the information itself. 48 Discretionary accounts and straight
recommendations to buy (without further explanation) are two of the
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, Jan., 1970 (unpublished manuscript, University of
Chicago). See also Scholes, A Test of the Competitive Market Hypothesis: The Market for New
Issues and Secondary Offerings, (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago)
(strongly suggesting insider "knowledge" by pointing out that secondary offerings by control
persons are more profitable to sellers than secondaries sold by anyone else); Jensen & Benington,
Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence, Dec., 1969 (unpublished
paper presented at American Finance Association Meetings, New York).
44. Lorie & Niederhoffer, supra note 39. The astounding thing is that so much insider
trading shows up even' though stock must be held for a minimum of 6 months after it is
purchased, since the insiders reporting in the study by Lorie and Niederhoffer would have been
liable for any gains made by a purchase and sale within 6 months under § 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). I would still believe that the vastly greater
source of knowledgeable trading is done by those at least once removed from statutory insiders.
45. See ITSM,supra note I, chs. IV, V.
46. Not too surprisingly, it was an economist who seemed most to have confused § 16(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). See Weston, Book
Review, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 140 (1966).
47. ITSM, supra note i, at 63.
48. Id., ch. V.
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more obvious. Since writing the book, I have come to understand that
I should have included limited partnerships in investment banking
houses and a variety of mutual funds as well4 9
It would be relatively easy for the SEC to perform the statistical
test necessary to answer the question of how much indirect trading
occurs. They need only get an appropriate set of tax returns showing
stock market trading profits for individuals who could be identified as
likely to have access to information about companies. The results of
the trading of these individuals would then be compared to that of a
control group such as security analysts or professors of finance, who
certainly have considerably sophistication but who do not 'necessarily
have access to new information.-"
If the results of such a test showed the former group to be doing
significantly better in the stock market than the latter group, we might
then have confirmation of my thesis of how new information gets
transmuted into the proper stock market price. But, as I have said
before, until such a test is performed, it should not be assumed that
people with access to tremendous wealth would let it slip through their
fingers like sand. The opposite assumption is vastly ,more in keeping
with our knowledge of human nature and business institutions .5
I am neither a statistician nor a mathematician, but I urge any
reader to try the following simple test that I and students of mine have
conducted on several occasions: write down for some period of time
49. Text accompanying notes 108-12 infra.
50. Somehow Mendelson, supra note 2, at 473, assumes that security analysts will have
inside information because they have thoroughly familiarized themselves with the company.
Apparently he and I have a different kind of information in mind.
51. I made the precise point of this last sentence in a concluding paragraph of Chapter V
of my book. I began that paragraph with the following sentence: "The important proposition of
this chapter is that the market for valuable information described actually exists." ITSM, supra
note I, at 75. i then mentioned that the chapter had examined the evidence to substantiate this
proposition and concluded as I have in the text above. This paragraph sent Professor Schotland
gyrating to dizzying literary heights: "I find this paragraph astonishing. The leap from the
opening assertion that the case has been proved to the very different conclusion that at least its
opposite has not been proved is dazzling-the blur of fact, allegation and assumption, dizzying."
Schotland, supra note 2, at 1432 n.22 (emphasis added). This is followed by a characteristically
"cute" quote from Lewis Carroll, the characteristic being Schotland's, not Carroll's.
I found this footnote of Schotland's not astonishing, but puzzling, mainly because I could
not understand the italicized phrase. Finally it dawned upon me that Professor Schotland did not
know the meaning of the word "proposition." For his edification I quote from WEBSTER's THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961): "something proposed or offered for consideration,
acceptance, or adoption. . .. the point to be discussed or maintained in argument usually stated
in sentence form near the outset. ... Id. at 1819.
No wonder Professor Schotland has such difficulty understanding insider transactions; he
doesn't know a proposition when he sees one.
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every story appearing in The Wall Street Journal which could be
expected to have a truly significant impact on a company's stock price;
then go through the price reports well before and after that disclosure
to find when the correlating price change seemed actually to occur."
My somewhat unscientific evidence to date suggests that in a very large
percentage of cases the stock price reaction occurs before the news
appears in print. And this is at least consistent with every statistical
study relevant to the same question.
53
We should not be fooled by the scarcity of SEC enforcement
actions" into believing that there is not much insider trading and that
the SEC apprehends that little bit when it occurs-though that is what
we are told the facts are.55 That is like pleas to New York City cab
drivers to treat Harlem like any other section of the city since the police
do not make any more arrests for muggings there than elsewhere.
There is no reason to believe that the use of valuable information,
albeit perhaps in the indirect fashion which I discussed in my book, has
changed in any significant degree in the years since Texas Gulf
52. This is not a rigorous test; at best the results should be termed impressionistic. There
are very great difficulties in trying to correlate new developments with stock price changes, since
prices are changing for a variety of reasons at all times and one cannot be certain that the
information which seems to be desirable will actually be taken that way. As Lore and
Niederhoffer state, "[u]nfortunately, analysis of insider trading around such events in isolation
from the price movements of the company can never reveal whether insiders profited from their
information. For example, the price of the stock frequently increases consistently before and after
the announcement of a divided reduction and a decrease in earnings." Lorie & Niederhoffer, supra
note 39, at 46.
53. Again, the best thing on the subject is Lorie & Niederhoffer, supra note 39. They
analyzed insider trading before large price changes in a stock (defined as changes of 8% or more)
and found insiders to be considerably superior forecasters of large changes. In fact, such a
difference between insiders and non-insiders could occur incidentally only in I out of 10,000 cases.
Their other tests gave similar results. Id. at 46, 47, 49. Indeed, anyone interested in the subject
of insider trading must study this article carefully. This is also consistent with the interesting study
of Bellemore & Blucher, A Study of Stock Splits in the Postwar Years, 15 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS
J. 19 (1956). They report findings that from 8 weeks before to the day after the announcement
of a desirable stock split, 86 out of 100 stocks registered percentage price increases greater than
those of the Standard and Poor's Stock Price Index for the relevant industry group. From the
day after to 8 weeks after the announcement date, however, only 43 stocks registered percentage
price increases greater than the relevant industry index. There must be some reason for this
disparity, and the most likely is certainly insider trading. See also S. Pratt & DeVere, Relationship
Between Insider Trading and Rates of return for NYSE Common Stocks, 1960-1966 (1968)
(unpublished manuscript available from Professor Shannon P. Pratt, Portland State College,
Portland, Oregon).
54. Since the much heralded Texas Gulf litigation began, there have been only 2 announced
matters involving indirect insider trading. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. Rep.,
92, 504 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1969) and the Merrill Lynch matter involving Douglas Aircraft
stock, SEC Securities Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
55. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 2, at 214. See also note 106 infra.
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Sulphur. The truth of the matter is that the much touted, highly
sophisticated, computerized detection techniques used by the SEC to
ferret out insider trading do not work very well. This may explain why
they have not publicized these techniques, though it is said that their
machines pick up any dramatic shift in price or volume in trading in
a particular stock. 6 This must be a long, long way from proving, or
perhaps even suspecting, which individuals are exploiting new
information. The peculiar thing is that the SEC has announced so few
cases. While I do not believe their enforcement techniques are nearly
as good as they say, I find it difficult to believe that they could be as
bad as their track record would indicate. Perhaps the Commission does
not fully investigate every insider trading case. It could be that already
this extremely potent device is being used arbitrarily or politically 7
V. STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY
There are still at least two good reasons for defending insider
trading aside from the point that ultimately there is no loss to outsiders
from the practice. The more controversial of the two arguments is that
insider trading provides an appropriate form of-compensation for
entrepreneurial activity in large corporations. The other argument, that
insider trading makes the stock market function more efficiently, is
probably the more obvious economic argument.
The efficient functioning of the stock market is actually one of the
strongest arguments for unfettered insider trading, though at first blush
it may appear to have little relationship to the issue at hand. I must
confess that the significance of this point escaped me at the time I
wrote my book, even though the point itself was recognized 8 For this
reason I cannot take my critics to task for not realizing that there was
a very significant additional argument for insider trading. Of course,
they were not exactly looking for arguments in its favor.
Efficiency in the stock market refers to both the speed and
accuracy with which the market integrates new information into the
market price of a security 9 All other things being equal, the more
56. Jennings, supra note 2, at 1232. See also 1966 SEC ANN. REP. 8-9.
57. Cf. M. SHULMAN, THE BILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL 219 (1969) (reporting the whispered
suggestion that this explains the appearance of the Texas Gulfcase in the first place).
58. See, e.g., ITSM, supra note I, at 88. See also Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems:
Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 266 (1967). For a slightly different version of this thesis,
see Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 260 (1968).
59. See Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 26 (H.
Manne ed. 1969).
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efficiently the stock market functions, the better off everyone is for
many reasons. An efficient market is one in which capital will be
allocated to its highest-return uses, thus ensuring that capital goes into
those uses with the greatest individual and social utility. This
significance of the stock market as an allocator of capital has long been
recognized.'" More recently recognized, however, is that stock market
prices may also serve to allocate management and the control of
corporations." The price of a company's stock is the best indicator of
the performance record of existing management and the potential
profitability of a takeover. Thus to the extent that the stock market is
functioning efficiently, both the capital markets and the market for
corporate control function more effectively.
The ultimate social significance 'of market efficiency is somewhat
difficult to assess. It is, of course, an oft-stated goal of the SEC,
though that alone does little to establish its significance. Ultimately,
the desirability of efficiency in a market relates to individual goals. If
we assume that individuals can maximiie their own trading positions
or diversify investment portfolios more accurately with information
than without, then it follows that the most rapid and correct reflection
of new information in quoted prices will allow each individual the
maximum opportunity to help himself. Delays in the reflection of new
information, or the inaccurate reflection of information, must increase
uncertainty in the market and thereby make beneficial trading more
costly and less likely than would otherwise be the case. But it is the
nature of the case that at any one moment, no individual knows
whether the market is operating efficiently or not for the security he
contemplates buying or selling. The gains from efficiency are diffuse
and often specifically unidentifiable. If it were otherwise, commentators
would probably not treat the SEC so nicely when it lessens that
efficiency.
A. Market Speed
Quite clearly there is a time lag between the development of new
information and its ultimate publication to outsiders, even if we could
assume perfect compliance with a rule against insider trading. But, as
60. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 280
(1932).
61. Manne, supra note 58, at 265; Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). See also Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15




discussed earlier, perfect enforcement is not possible, and therefore
subterfuges and devices to circumvent the rule against insider trading
will be discovered and utilized. Of necessity these devices will consume
time, and to the extent that time is expended in order to avoid
compliance with the SEC rule, all other individuals who benefit from
an efficient stock market are injured.
Nonetheless, we have it on the affidavit of Professor Schotland
that
[allowing any trading on undisclosed material information makes improper delay
of disclosure more likely . . . .To ensure timely disclosure-an end to which the
SEC and the self-regulatory bodies are equally dedicated-it is obvious that we
must avoid encouraging motivations for improper delay, however subconscious
they may be. If we abandon restraints on insider trading, we tempt insiders to
delay disclosures so that they can buy more shares or arrange financing for more
buying; we also invite the timing of disclosure to get maximum market response.
2
Perhaps this need not detain us, however, for in the very next sentence,
just in passing, Professor Schotland contradicts himself: "[O]n
occasion the concern for insider trading profits might cause disclosure
to be made earlier than it would be without insider trading; but they
may not be in the best interests of the corporation ... .
There are several errors in the principal quote that should be
exposed, since Schotland is not the only one who makes them. First
of all he implies, without any supporting evidence, that present
restraints on insider trading are completely effective. Obviously, if they
are not completely effective then Professor Schotland cannot know that
the time spent in circumventing rules would not be greater than the
time spent in "arranging financing" or whatever else needs to be done
to capitalize legally on information. The presumption would seem to
be the opposite, but Schotland never notices the impact of partial
enforcement, and consequently his position is unrealistic.
He did, however, take note of the obvious proposition that the
disclosure time for a great deal of news cannot be controlled and
therefore is not delayed by allowing insider trading. But then, in what
seems like a fretful nonsequitur, he responds that it is no "answer to
allow unfettered inside trading by personnel who have no role in
deciding upon the timing of disclosure . . "63
Another thing that Professor Schotland fails to realize in his
conclusion is that any insider trading must cause an improper delay in
62. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1448-49 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 1449. Professor Scotland has in this response apparently shifted the ground away
from the point at issue, the timing of disclosure, back to the propriety of insider trading.
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disclosure. People with accurate and reliable information will generally
be well advised not to risk their almost certain profit by delaying the
exploitation of that information. That is, their incentive will be to move
very quickly, with whatever resources are at their command, to profit
from their information. Even if news were 100 percent reliable and
correct, with each additional minute, hour; or day the probability of a
new event occurring to cause a decline in the same stock's price rises
rapidly. It will generally be a poorer but wiser insider who fails to take
immediate advantage of reliable information. It should be noted that
disclosure must in any event occur fairly shortly after insider trading
if the insider is to make any profit. While his own trading and that of
other traders may drive the price up, it would ordinarily be extremely
expensive to maintain such a high price unless new information
justifying it is disclosed. In the short run, then, insider trading may
have the same effect as disclosure, but in the longer run, unless there
is very substantial money supporting the market, disclosure will have
to occur very quickly."
Possibly Professor Schotland and the SEC could adduce
individual cases in which some form of delay in disclosure occurred
while insider trading was or might be occurring. But once again,
perhaps with a need for more patience than I have, one is constrained
to point out that social policy should not be made on the basis of
episodic vignettes taken from the annals of SEC enforcement actions.
We must either utilize hard, accurate data or we should proceed on the
assumptions dictated by the most logical economic doctrines. Lawyers
simply must get over their bad habit of assuming that because they can
conjure up one horrible case, it must reflect the general behavior of
humanity; otherwise, someone eventually will be tempted to say that
social policy is too important to be left to the lawyers.
64. This point, I believe, explains the rough going Professor Mendelson has in trying to
establish outsider injury. His "long run," where he posits some injury, probably never occurs.
Mendelson, supra note 2, at 476-77. His argument is as follows: Since all shares of stock arc
readily substitutable and investors plan their portfolios based on diversification of anticipated
rates of return (discounted by risk) insider purchasing of securities on undisclosed information
would seem to have an undesirable effect. As insiders purchased without disclosing reasons why,
other investors would continue to evaluate the shares as they previously had, and thus would want
fewer of those shares at the new higher price and relatively more of all outsiders and a general
depression in the price of the stock. Q.E.D. Insider trading on good news causes lower prices for
shares. Mendelson's error, apart from the fact that it is blatantly contradicted by every empirical
study ever made on the subject, derives from his failure to realize that insiders will disclose the
information long before the secondary effect he describes can take place. Schotland makes exactly




1. Feasibility of Disclosure.-The second functional relationship
between insider trading and an efficient stock market might be termed
accuracy. The point most simply stated is that insiders are generally
in the best position to weigh new information accurately and assess its
future impact on market price. To some degree, however, speed and
accuracy become intermingled, for ultimately the proper weight to be
attributed to any information becomes evident to others in the market.
One may indeed have to wait months or even years until the true value
of the information shows up in the form of changed earnings, but
ultimately the truth will come out. The most important question is who
is in the best position to do this weighing at the time the information
actually develops.
The answer to this question has far reaching significance. It calls
into doubt not simply the rule about insider trading, but the entire
"philosophy of full disclosure." This so-called philosophy has
captivated-many observers of government regulation. The popularity of
the notion accounts in large measure for the almost religious fervor
with which politicians, bureaucrats, and professors adore the SEC.
After all, who can be against full disclosure? The very suggestion
smacks of condoning fraud, lying, and deceit. Nor need one join the
radicals to favor a regulatory philosophy of full disclosure since it is
simply designed to make free markets function better. 5 Thus,
proponents of this idea can appear at one and the same time to be
practical hard-headed men of affairs and yet idealists concerned with
the commonweal.
Historically, the idea traces back to the early part of this century,66
but it was just a bit of academic rhetoric until the advent of the
Securities Act of 1933, the "Truth in Securities" law. At that point a
great innovation was proclaimed, an administrative system designed,
not to regulate, but to make promoters and underwriters tell the full
truth about new securities. Even today the idea of direct securities
regulation makes a dedicated SEC partisan frown. He knows that
direct regulation-unless it happens to be of investment advisors, stock
brokers, stock exchanges, holding companies or mutual funds-is futile
65. It also allows such nonsense statements as that "any friend of the free market ...
almost certainly should urge additional regulatory steps." Schotland, supra note 2, at 1468. The
problem becomes the solution.
66. W, RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) is the best-known work on the
subject.
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or even harmful, and he prefers not to be involved with petty
administration that is better left to state Blue Sky administrators.
Over the years, adherents of the disclosure religion have had it
very easy, psychologically speaking. No one has seriously questioned
their belief. Indeed, whole new generations of lawyers have been
brought up to appreciate the beauty of the disclosure arrangement. But
"full disclosure" should no longer enjoy this sanctuary. In the Age of
Aquarius, some troubling questions simply must be raised. For
instance, what is the cost of administering a full disclosure system as
compared to the benefits actually gained; what private interests are
actually benefitted, and at what cost to others; what is the effect of the
present system of disclosure on the production of valuable information;
and to what extent is the service provided by the SEC merely a subsidy
to a financial group who would otherwise have to pay their own way?
For now, however, we must limit ourselves to another very
fundamental question, so fundamental indeed that one is almost
embarrassed for his profession to report that prior to the publication
of Insider Trading and Stock Market, no one had ever raised it. The
issue is whether full disclosure is in any meaningful sense feasible! Can
it even be done?1
7
We start by recognizing that there are two kinds of information
in the world: (1) information which has been previously disclosed or
evaluated in the market, and (2) information which represents a move
to a new objective circumstance, that is, change. I denoted these as first
and second category information. I apologize for such prosaic titles,
and if that is why the reviewers have ignored the point, perhaps they
were justified.
First category information has no market value as such, since the
present market price fully reflects all the past events leading to the
present position. It is a free good68 and is of no direct interest to this
discussion, though it is of some derivative interest, as we shall note
shortly.
New information relevant to a security's price, second category
information, may be of many different sorts. Although some of this
information does not lend itself to full disclosure in the usual sense at
all, it is the only kind of information relevant to individual stock price
changes. We may organize interesting bits of information about change
67. The discussion following is not intended to be an exhaustive catalog of all disclosure
feasibility problems. The effort is merely to note some of the highlights.
68. A free good has been defined as one for which nothing at all need be sacrificed to
acquire as much as one wishes. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 17.
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into several broad categories. First, we might look at the familiar kinds
of financial information. The financial news most commonly affecting
share price is a significant change in annual earnings. Yet, even the
least sophisticated market hibitues are familiar with cases where
apparently excellent earnings are met by a neutral or even negative
market response. Conversely lower earnings may not cause what would
seem to be a sufficient decline in price. Simply having the new earnings
figure might not be sufficient to allow informed trading.
There are numerous possible explanations for this phenomenon.
The most likely is that the information has already been anticipated
in the market. That is, the new earnings report is not actually news at
all, and only those with blind confidence in the SEC's disclosure
philosophy could be misled into losing money by following such a
disclosure. More important for immediate purposes, however, is the
possibility that the current earnings, while not previously discounted,
are still insufficient to change the market's estimate of the present value
of potential future earnings. Sometimes this may be evident to a good
securities analyst, but there must be a significant number of instances
in which the best guess about the company's present worth is based not
on current earnings but on information that has not been or indeed
could not be legally divulged in any SEC-regulated financial
statement.6
9
There is another kind of information which the SEC seems
absolutely determined to hide from the world. This is the true value of
the capital assets used in a business. The familiar rule, rigidly enforced
by the SEC, is that assets must be carried by the company at the lower
of cost or market, minus depreciation.7 ° No matter how much inflation
has occurred and no matter how much a particular asset may have
appreciated, the SEC generally forbids publication of the true value.71
Asset valuqs would seem to be first category information and therefore
not of great interest. However, in some specialized instances they may
become extremely relevant. If for instance the useful life of a particular
asset is about to expire, analysts may be very interested to know the
replacement cost. More important is the possibility that always exists
for an asset to be sold at a high profit. 2
69. E.g., Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969) (forbidding predictions as to "specific
future market values, earnings or dividends" in proxy solicitation materials).
70. See generally 11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIEs REGULATION, H. SOWARDS,
FEDERAL SECURITIES AcT § 8.01 3] (1965).
71. 1 say "generally" because apparently when it suits their purpose the SEC will change
rules in midstream. See Manne, Some Accounting and Administrative Law Aspects of Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogno, Inc., 15 N.Y.L.F. 304 (1969).
72. The SEC in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), tries to
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This is not the appropriate place to enter a lengthy discussion of
problems of asset value accounting 3 But it is proper to make one
simple observation: insiders in a company or an industry are frequently
the only people who can possibly make realistic valuation assessments.
Of necessity, they will generally be able to do this more accurately and
efficiently than anyone else, and there may be no accurate or efficient
way of passing this information along to the public.74 Consequently,
allowing tlose individuals to trade on this information would
necessarily improve the efficiency with which the stock market
assimilates new information into stock prices. A fortiori, the same
analysis holds for the SEC's other big bugaboo, earnings estimates."
There are many other accounting issues about which the same
point can be made. For instance, there are all those accounting
questions on which there is more than one generally accepted
accounting standard. One need only wander lightly over issues such as
inventory accounting, treatment of tax credits, allocation of overhead
costs, merger accounting, and accounting for economic risk (e.g., leases
or stock options) to realize that a science of accounting is still an idle
dream. Basing a regulatory system on the idea that such an ethereal
concept is scientific guarantees either that the public will be deceived
or that the market cannot function efficiently, or both.
Frequently, new developments in a firm or industry cannot be the
subject of full disclosure. The development may be a new product, a
new mineral discovery, an important government or private contract,
a finding of a health hazard in a product-or any of these things
happening to a competitor. For a variety of reasons it may be
impossible to make a straightforward, useful disclosure to the public.
Obviously this need not be true in every case, but there will be a
significant number of such cases, and we know almost nothing about
the magnitudes involved. Not surprisingly, nothing is ever said about
these instances by proponents of the full disclosure philosophy. 6
make a classification of assets for which "a ready market exists." See Manne, supra note 71, at
320. But since that likelihood, at least in the real world, is always a function of the price offered
in the market for the asset, the test will probably not yield helpful results.
73. Id. at 314-27.
74. Consider, for instance, whether one should use replacement value or liquidation value,
and how to compute these? See generally R. CHAMBERS, ACCOUNTING, EVALUATION AN!)
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, chs. 9, 10 (1966).
75. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969).
76. Presumably a few lawyers who practice actively in the area are sophisticated about these
problems when they arise. But their knowledge relates more to techniques for dealing with the
SEC on the matter than to the policy or quantitative questions left hanging in this area. In the
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For example, a new defense contract may inevitably lead to an
actual loss for a company, even though the unsophisticated public's
reaction to the news would be to bid up the price of the stock. New
product announcements have frequently occasioned this sort of
difficulty." Who can know how much start-up costs will be, or what
the market might be for a new product, or what the competition has
up its sleeve? It would be far better to allow those insiders who
understand these matters in detail to "make the market" for these
companies' shares. True, a good securities analyst may discover much
of this information, but equally true, he will rarely be in the same
position as insiders to assess all of the relevant factors. Furthermore,
information can be processed and acted upon much more quickly by
an insider than by the public, and, of course, the insider can hire
outside expertise as well as the next man. The list of problem disclosure
areas could be enlarged indefinitely, yet all one hears about are
developments which in retrospect the SEC argues were appropriate for
full public disclosure.78
The final type of information which does not lend itself to full
disclosure might be termed management news. In this category occur
some of the most significant events ever affecting business. High on the
list would be the problem of personal animosities developing within a
corporation which threaten to tear apart a smoothly functioning
organization. Certainly no one seriously proposes public disclosure of
such sensitive, and often private, information. The benefit -to
competitors would far outweigh any benefits others might receive from
the information. But the effect of a full disclosure rule in these
circumstances is necessarily to maintain an artificial price until the
disruption in management has caused severe deterioration in the
earnings of the company or some other dramatic event has occurred.
During that entire period of time the market price of that company's
securities could be wrong. Can anyone seriously suggest that the harm
to the public from this is somehow less than it would be from allowing
insiders to assure an informed current price for the company's shares?
Other managerial developments might have the same effect. The
most common is probably the case of failing health of a key executive.
camaraderie of intra-professional conversation most lawyers admit that many of the most
significant facts relating to the value of a company stock never pass through the SEC's disclosure
mill. But see Mendelson, supra note 2, at 476.
77. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961).
78. The two signal cases in this regard are Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
and Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogomo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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The problem of failing mental faculties could never be objectively
reported, though they might be clearly observed by others around the
executive. Again, how much smoother and more efficient it would be
to allow insiders to register this news in the market, even though actual
disclosure would not be possible.
The point should now be clear. Asset valuation problems,
accounting issues, competitive positions, potential earnings and
managerial developments are examples of news items that will always
prevent the philosophy of full disclosure, no matter what its theoretical
merit, from existing in the real world. The time is past for assuming
on faith that the amount of disclosure which does actually occur as a
result of SEC rules is either significant or by itself helpful.
2. The Market-Smoothing Effect of Insider Trading.-The
suggestion that insider trading gives us a more efficient stock market
leads to still another advantage which I did not discuss in my book.7
There I was concerned exclusively with the exploitation of news about
significant events80 In fact, however, it is desirable to have all ups and
downs smoothed out to the extent possible by an efficient market
mechanism that reacts sensitively to even small inappropriate
movements. This suggests the desirability of allowing insiders in
corporations to do something on the order of "making a market" in
their company's shares. As indicated above, they are in the best
position to do that job effectively, and, in spite of some expressed fears
that they would spend all their time trading in the market, there is
really no reason to believe that this practice would have undesirable
effects on their managerial skills. It would remain true that good
management would bring the greatest profits to the managers. The time
necessary to exploit information, or correct misconceptions as they
appear in the market, would in all likelihood be considerably shorter
than the time required to circumvent rules against insider trading.
In over-the-counter stocks, where market makers may still occupy
positions on boards of directors, this is almost exactly what occurs, and
it is difficult to see the market maker as anything other than a
privileged insider."' Would it not at least be a good idea for the SEC
79. See note 58 supra.
80. I took these to be events causing a 10% or greater change in the stock's price. For a
while, perhaps under the influence of Texas Gulf Sulphur, I felt that I had been too optimistic
and that I should have considered changes in the range of 20% to 30%. Lorie & Niederhoffer,
supra note 39, however, used changes of 8% to indicate significant price movement. The point in
the text is that the figure really makes no difference, since if it is large enough to motivate insiders
to trade, that is the trading we are talking about.
81. He is, however, exempt from the usual short-swing insiders' profit rule. 1934
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to know whether underwriters make or lose money in their market
making function? Does anyone seriously believe that market makers
have no more information than public investors, or less than the chief
executive of the company? And how are we "nuts"82 supposed to think
they get it-through research?
C. Market Manipulation
To complete the discussion of whether or not allowing insider
trading would give a more efficient market than do post-Texas Gulf
Sulphur legal rules, we must still look at one additional factor that
may vary with the rule. That additional factor is market manipulation.
No one defends this, and there is general agreement that manipulation
does add a high cost to the functioning of the market. It causes the
market to function less efficiently, that is, to reflect objective values less
accurately. Moreover, ihdividuals are directly injured by manipulative
activity, as with any fraudulent behavior.
Manipulation differs dramatically from insider trading, just as a
reliable tip on a winning horse differs from having the race "fixed".
If all insider trading could be effectively prevented, there would
probably be no fraudulent manipulation of stock prices, since no one
could gain from it. But that does not decide the underlying issue about
insider trading, for clearly there may be policing costs which are too
high for anyone to accept. After all, outlawing horse racing is the
surest method of preventing fixed races. -
No evidence has been adduced by the SEC or its spokesmen that
allowing insider trading actually encourages manipulation. Professor
Schotland 3 is hard pressed to say anything meaningful about
manipulation. He conjures up one single situation in which insiders
have bought shares well in advance of disclosure of the information and
then-manimlated the-market to keen the nrice hi gh over n lenpthv
does not explain to us why insiders in these circumstances
at all when they did. Perhaps more important, he does not
X-3 , V SUI IL' p"r l ' ' , xa ,,, &-w i i;,' , A
Id not make the disclosure earlier. If in fact they are able
s task without detection, they have every interest in doing
.S.C. § 78p(d) (1964). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 7905 (June
;, SECURITIES REGULATION 3084, 3089 (1969).
, as applied to me, originates with the SEC official quoted in Schotland, supra
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so regardless of the rule against insider trading. For that matter, people
who are not insiders would have just as much interest in doing so.
Therefore, even if such activity really does go on, which is highly
doubtful, its relationship to the rule regarding insider trading is not
proved.
Even more mystifying is Professor Schotland's second and
concluding reason why insider trading makes manipulation more likely:
"As seen earlier, insider buying in itself does not have any significant
impact on share price. But the contrary may well be the case, if a group
of insiders intentionally time their buying so as to affect the price. It
is an old tactic of manipulation to intentionally time orders to have
such effect .... ,,81 It is an old tactic of polemical debate to use
obfuscation as a conscious means of argument, and we have here a
perfect example. Even apart from the volte-face on the price impact
question, this statement as an argument against insider trading is
meaningless. At best, it only says that manipulation of stock market
prices is possible. To give it one more bit of credit, it also says that
this may be done by insiders. It certainly does not say that it may not
as well be done by others or even that such action is not more likely
to be done by outsiders. The case used to illustrate the point, SEC v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.,8 is actually inapposite since it does not even
deal with an insider's utilizing undisclosed information to gain an edge
in stock trading. It is a case of stock price manipulation to which the
insider aspect is purely incidental. 8
D. The SEC's Confidence Game
Supporters of the SEC have voiced one further argument against
insider trading. It is an all-purpose argument which undoubtedly
originated in the earliest days of federal securities legislation. In its
general form it seems to say that unless the public knows that the
market is being regulated by the government, they will be afraid to
invest in the public securities market. The specialized variant for insider
trading purposes says that if the public believed that insider trading was
occurring regularly, they would lose all confidence in the stock market
and cease investing funds there.87
84. Id.
85. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,692 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
86. See SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,504 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
30, 1969) (while not providing reliable evidence of the impact of insider trading rules on
manipulation, this case at least illustrates the point Professor Schotland had in mind).
87. Marsh, supra note 2, at 1320; Poser, supra note 2, at 754; Schotland, supra note 2, at
1475; Sommer, supra note 2, at 692.
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There are several things wrong with this line of argument. The first -
and most obvious is that the public has never shown any signs of losing
confidence in the stock market because of the existence of insider
trading. No one cognizant of the history of the twenties could claim
otherwise. In 1929 there were over twenty million shareholders on the
books of American companies, 8 though the actual number of
individual investors was, of course, much smaller. Nonetheless, it is
doubtful that direct shareholders during the bull markets of 1962 or
1968 actually were a larger percentage of the total population than
those of 1929.89 Moreover, all of this occurred with the widest publicity
and notoriety imaginable being given to bull pools and other insider
trading devices. In fact, stories of these activities were the normal daily
fare of the pre-crash financial press. The loss of public confidence in
the stock market is not visible. The public, it would seem, is less
gullible than spokesmen for the SEC.
The next problem with the confidence argument is the implicit
proposition that insider trading is not occurring today. As we have
already seen, 0 there is little evidence to warrant that assumption. But
publicizing such an idea may have troublesome consequences. Some
unsophisticated members of the investing public must believe that the
SEC has removed all risk of loss from the securities market, or at least
lessened it in some meaningful sense by stopping insider trading. That,
of course, is not the case. The risk to an outsider is unchanged in any
significant degree by the insider trading rule adopted. Therefore, some
investors are lured into the stock market by an SEC-instigated notion
that the risk is less than is actually the case.
I doubt that a great many people have been sandbagged by the
government in this way, though a reliable informant at the Commission
tells me that a substantial amount of mail is received by the
Commission and Congress from individuals complaining that they have
lost money in the stock market even though the SEC was supposed to
prevent this.
There is undoubtedly some problem of public confidence in the
integrity of the participants in the stock market. The disclosures of
fraud and manipulation by the Pecora Hearings9' in 1933 were by no
88. R. SOBEL, THE GREAT BULL MARKET 73 (1968).
89. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF NEGOTIATED COMMISSION
RATES ON THE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY-THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE SECURITIES AND THE
INVESTING PUBLIC 13 (1968).
90. See notes 39 & 43 supra.
91. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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means without foundation. But the actual fraud and manipulation
publicized by the hearings never involved just trading on inside
information, and in numerous instances there was no insider
participation whatever. The public does have a real interest in knowing
whether fraudulent types of criminal behavior are being effectively
policed. Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess how good or bad a
job the SEC does on this, as they do not publish adequate data from
which a reliable conclusion could be drawn. Probably their detection
and prevention of truly harmful behavior could be improved upon.
Certainly if they would devote more of their resources to such clearly
justifiable activities, everyone would be better off?2
There is one other aspect of the confidence argument which should
be examined. It is the questionable assumption that there is some clear
social interest in having people channel their savings into investments
in the stock market. Of course, stock exchanges, brokers, and
underwriters are benefited by any encouragement a government agency
can give their particular efforts, but that is not necessarily true for the
public. Any savings will eventually become invested, and the money
does not have to be channeled through the stock market to effect this.
Commercial banks or any number of other intermediaries might serve
as well.
This is not to suggest that the stock market is not a highly efficient
and desirable means for channeling investment. It is to say, however,
that it is unseemly for a government agency to gear its regulatory
activities to encouraging business for the industry it is supposed to
regulate. In principle, at least, the SEC should be indifferent to whether
the public prefers stocks to savings accounts or mutual funds to
brokers. It is well recognized, however, that agencies do come to
"'represent" their industries-usually to the public's detriment," and
they do this typically under the .guise of keeping the industry
"healthy," so that the public will not lose confidence in it.
SVI. ENTREPRENEURIAL REWARD
My principle affirmative argument for insider trading was that it
provided a meaningful form of compensation in large corporations for
92. Actually the SEC seems to be bucking a trend, since elsewhere the direction of criminal
law is away from enforcing purely moral codes such as those involved in the prohibition of
pornography, marijuana, prostitution, and insider trading.
93. For an excellent inside story on regulatory agencies, see The Regulators Can't Go On
This Way, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 28, 1970, at 60. Incidentally, Ralph Nader is quoted therein as
saying that stock tips are used to pay off agency staff members in Washington. Id. at 65.
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the entrepreneurial function. This occasioned the greatest and most
vociferous opposition of any point in the book. In a way, this was quite
surprising, since the principles I drew upon constitute the most
fundamental and basic postulates known to economic theory; people
would rather have more of a good thing than less, and normally there
is a point at which a person will give up some amount of one good to
gain an amount of another which he values more highly. 4 That is,
human wants are infinite, and all demand curves have negative slopes.
As a corollary, the amount of the goods offered goes up as the price
offered increases.
In terms of the thesis of the book, one need note only, as Professor
Schotland said, some "simple economics." If any service presently
being purchased by the corporation is compensated more highly, more
of that service will be offered. Valuable information is an economic
good that can be substituted for other media in which the higher
compensation can be paid. If the service performed is or can be one
which gives access to valuable information, less of other forms of
compensation must be paid in order to secure the same amount of the
service.
This is true regardless of the nature of the employment. It is true
of clerks, accountants, lawyers, or someone performing an
entrepreneurial service. Clearly, if some entrepreneurship is being
performed for publicly held corporations, more of it will occur if the
potential pay-off is greater. One may argue about identifying the
performers of this function or controlling access to information. But
the basic point stated above simply cannot be denied or disparaged.
There are economic laws, and they are not repealed by anyone's
ignorance of them, whether participants or observers.
The news may not impress my critics, but I for one still cannot
understand why anyone finds it to be unfair, unjust, or immoral to
allow a voluntary arrangement in which individuals are given an
additional incentive to produce more of a valuable commodity by
sharing in the new value they produce. Lawyers familiar with the
contingent fee should scarcely be surprised. But law professors
apparently are not comfortable with abstract ideas of economic
functions, like entrepreneurship.
A. The Moral Imperative
In some ways the most disconcerting thing about many of the
reviews of my book was the strange belief that we must decide whether
94. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 17, at 16.
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everyone will act in one way or the other; either every corporation must
allow insider trading, or none may. Why the note of compulsion? Why
the moral imperative? Why not the liberty of choice?
It is difficult to understand the origins of this particular attitude.
Perhaps it derives from a notion that the express contractual terms of
an employment relationship must describe all aspects of that
relationship. Thus, if an individual enters into a contract providing a
straight salary and no other form of compensation, then it is argued
that he is entitled only to that salary and nothing else. Any additional
income is, as various proponents of the Texas Gulf rule have declared,
"covert," "unjust enrichment," or "unnecessary to secure
performance." As Professor Hetherington in his generally logical and
insightful piece states:
[r]here is a strong argument that the innovations produced by these persons have
already been bought and paid for. Their employer gives them salaries, bonuses,
stock options, retirement plans and freedom from the distracting worries of
running a business, worries that beset the small inventor attempting to exploit his
ideaY5
While more calmly stated than most, this is typical of the underlying
notion that the terms of an employment relationship in a corporation
must be set either by regulatory authorities or explicitly in a fully
integrated contract of employment.
Manifestly there is no such doctrine of contract law, and yet none
of the usual legal approaches to the question of intent or implied rights
are discussed." No effort is made to show that the parties either by
their actions or their ambiguous words intended salaries, bonuses, and
other benefits to be the total means of compensation. Silence does not
usually have that effect.
Why then is everyone so quick to insist what the implied provision
in an insider's employment contract must be? Why do they assume that
the implied provision is so different today than it per force was before
the development of Rule lOb-5? And why finally do they assume that
anyone advocating no government rule against insider trading is
necessarily saying that it may not be banned in a private contract? All
the evidence seems to lean in the other direction-or at least it did
before Texas Gulf Sulphur.
I think that part of the answer goes to a set of attitudes
characteristic of many academics and their students. We live, as
Professor Hetherington eloquently points out, in a period of "moral
95. Hetherington, supra note 2, at 727.
96. See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 561 (1960).
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escalation.""7 But what Professor Hetherington fails to note about this
condition is how often moral indignation is used as a cover for
unanalyzed conclusions. While it is certainly the province of professors
to identify and explain such developments as moral escalation, it is
their ultimate responsibility to seek rational, logical answers to social
problems. As muchas they might like to don the mantle of high priests
of moral theology, this is neither their assignment nor their skill. Theirs
is a difficult job, but it will not long be respected unless the academic
profession stands foursquare behind the idea of rational inquiry.
At no point in my entire book do I express the belief that
corporations should be required to tolerate insider trading.11 As an
economist or objective analyst, I do not care what any corporation
may do in this regard. I personally would prefer to invest in the shares
of corporations which did allow insider trading. But if through legal
means a corporation properly indicates that its rule is no insider
trading, that should be the business of that corporation and its
shareholders and the courts if a violation is alleged. I wish that I had
said this earlier, but all I am pleading for is a rule of full disclosure.
If the SEC were faithful to its stated philosophy, it would simply
require every corporation to state whether or not insiders will be
allowed to use information in the stock market or under what
conditions this will be allowed. No more need be done.
Government regulators, however, do not like to take the risk of
having the regulated sector and the free market sector so easily
compared by the public. With regulatory philosophies as vacuous as
those which have been offered by friends of the SEC, it is no wonder
that they seek refuge in moral laws. And moral laws, unlike the rules
of government in a free society, can admit of no choice contrary to
their dictates. If one is to be moral, HE SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN
INSIDER TRADING. Deviant behavior, whether condoned by the
board of directors, the shareholders or anyone else, remains immoral
and unjust. The main trouble with moral escalation is that it is so
frequently fatuous.
97. Hetherington, supra note 2, at 734.
98. Manifestly that would be contrary to my whole economic philosophy. The only point
of my book was to defend individuals and corporations from the coercive mandate of a
government agency. Not one single reviewer noticed that while I am allowing, they would all
forbid absolutely. Ironically Professor Schotland states "that the Manne thesis miscasts the issue
by stating the question in terms of black and white: Shall insider trading be free, absolutely, or
banned absolutely?" Schotland, supra note 2, at 1439. The rest of the discussion on the same
page bears reading by anyone interested in the logical quality of this work, but I will not trouble
the reader with it further.
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B. Enough Is Enough
Professor Schotland says that there is "no reason to believe that
available forms of compensation are inadequate to stimulate
[entrepreneurial activity]." 9 I believe that he reads into my work
attitudes and thoughts that are foreign to it. I never talk about
adequacy or inadequacy in a vacuum. I do not know the distinction
between an adequate and an inadequate amount of entrepreneurial
activity. Like the economists, I can only say that if a larger amount
of compensation is offered for the performance of a function, more of
it will be forthcoming. I will stand by that statement until some
evidence is shown to the contrary. I might add that that proposition
has stood the test of time as well as anything known to the social
sciences.
A related point, which piqued nearly all the reviewers, was that the
individuals who will exploit the news may not truly be entrepreneurs.' 0
I discussed this point at length in my book and explained many reasons
why non-entrepreneurs would have access to new information.,', The
treatment of this material in the reviews was highly selective and
frequently inaccurate, and I see nothing to be gained by rehashing the
same points. Rather, I should like to try a different tack and suggest
to my critics that it really does not make any difference who gets
unexploited information or whether we can pin the tag of
"entrepreneur" on him. To reach the general conclusion of my thesis,
it will be sufficient merely to posit that the flow of information to
individuals without legal constraint is not random. About this, there
should be no argument, for if the flow is random, everyone has an
equal chance to benefit from it, and there would be no significant
"insider" problem. Thus, presumably everyone agrees that in an
unregulated or partially regulated information market, the flow of new
information will to some extent be directed.
If the allocation of information is in fact purposive, individuals
can make behaviorial decisions based on the expectations created
thereby. The additional wealth (or some positive probability of
achieving this wealth) will still be viewed as additional compensation
by those to whom it will be directed or allowed to flow. If other
compensation remains the same, more of their function will be offered
99. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1457.
100. Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 625
(1967); Hetherington, supra note 2, at 727; Jennings, supra note 2, at 1233; Kripke, supra note
2, at 213; Marsh, supra note 2, at 1319; Painter, supra note 2, at 151.
101. See, e.g., ITSM, supra note 1, at 65, 66, 69, 70, 153, 156-58, 160, 161, 171-89.
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by them or by others and their incentive to produce new information
or to cause more to be produced will be greater.
Since they have the most to gain thereby, the individuals receiving
information will already have or will eventually gain some power to
encourage new developments. This, I take it, is the quintessential
function of the entrepreneur in classical theory,10 2 and it is what I had
in mind in my book. But it should have been clear to any reader that
I did not wish to suggest that all recipients of information would
necessarily be this kind of entrepreneuer. I was at great pains to point
out °3 that leakage of confidential information is quite common and
that normally it would not pay insiders to invest in perfect policing. I
also pointed out that information might be used to pay off a variety
of debts, thus making it appear that the information was being used
by individuals with no important connection whatever to the
corporation. It is somewhat astounding to see some of these very points
turned around and used as criticisms of the thesis in which they
appear.'
Much of this dispute relates to the question of whether one can
assume a detectable, controllable, non-random flow of information
within a corporation. By implication the critics seem to be saying that
while it is not random, it always goes to the wrong people. Schotland,
for instance, states that it is an "ineluctable fact . . . that the use of
confidential information, if permitted at all, cannot be kept from
running rampant."''0 This, incidentally, is followed by the ineluctable
proposition that it is "comparatively easy for the SEC and the self-
regulatory bodies to detect insider trading on undisclosed material
information."'0 6 Why it is so much easier for the SEC than for people
102. Id. at 115-19.
103. Id. at 169.
104. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 2, at 1456.
105. Id..
106. 1d' Professor Schotland is not alone in this claim. See Jennings, supra note 2, at 1232;
Kripke, supra note 2, at 214. See also Posen, supra note 2, at 754. Professor Schotland tells u
at some length about the SEC's "stock watch" program which has "no problem" in tracing
buyers and sellers whenever there is suspicion of insider trading. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1456.
Professor Schotland proceeds then, as he does on several other occasions in his article,
substantially to contradict himself. On the very next page he concedes that tracing may be made
impossible by the use of "straws" or Swiss bank accounts. I presume.by "straws" he means
literally everyone that I include in my discussion of indirect trading on undisclosed information.
But this doesn't worry him since "there are not likely to be many such people. Compared with
most activity that must be made unlawful, enforcement here is as easy as it is for a young family
to figure out who ate the cookies." Let's see how easy it is to figure out who has to eat crow.
Schotland fails to recognize that the amount of violation of any law is a function of the
benefit to be gained by the violation. He then calmly proceeds to contradict himself by citing a
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who have a real economic interest in detecting this loss is not made
clear.
My prediction of SEC ineffectiveness in policing insider trading
would have been even more accurate had all participants in the stock
market realized how poorly the SEC enforces its rule. But Wall Street
is terrified of the SEC, and this definitely changes some individuals'
behavior.
There is, however, one thing on Wall Street which will overcome
even terror-money. The potential for profits in the utilization of
previously undisclosed information is enormous. I do not know of
anyone who has ever totaled up the full value of all the new
developments in a year for listed companies, but it must be in the tens
or even hundreds of billions of dollars, every single cent of it adding
to the incentive to find a way to avoid the terrible plight of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur insiders. With odds like that it is not surprising that they
have been fairly successful. Their very success may have created whole
new institutions in the financial community and had international
repercussions and countless personal effects. But succeed they
undoubtedly have, for if they had not, there would not be, as Professor
Schotland reminds us, such a high "frequency with which significant
corporate news is preceded by a notable rise in share price . ..
followed by 'selling on the news.' "107
C. Adjustments to the New Rules-The Interesting Case of Mutual
Funds
Interestingly, it is possible to find in the mutual fund industry
examples of personal, institutional, and international adjustments to
rules about insider trading. It is well known, of course, that this
industry has had an enormous growth in the past fifteen to twenty
years, and in the last five years we have seen the rapid expansion of
the hedge funds and in the last year or two, a veritable mushrooming
point with which I could not agree more, "the frequency with which significant corporate news
is preceeded by a notable rise in share price and then is followed by 'selling on the news.'"
Schotland, supra note 2, at 1474. And as topping for the dessert, just a few pages later we have
confirmation of this very point from none other than former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen:
"We have recently received indications that l~remature disclosure of corporate information to
limited groups of people who are in a position to act on it may be more prevalent than we had
supposed." Schotland, supra note 2, at 1478. So my critics no longer have to take my word (and
that of the economists cited in footnotes 39 and 43 supra) for the existence of a substantial
amount of insider trading. They also have it on the authority of Professor Schotland and Mr.
Cohen.
107. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1474.
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of "off-shore funds." Perhaps there is some link between each of these
developments and the need to find acceptable modes for marketing new
information.
Even though the value of new information in American companies
every year is enormous, it is obviously difficult for a small number of
insiders to exploit all this news. Some mechanism is needed which will
allow this information to be marketed profitably to masses of people.
It could be sold directly in the form of investment advice, and it could
be added to the value received from brokers who charge more than a
competitive price for their service. Finally, it could be marketed on a
truly grand scale through investment. companies. It is this last
hypothesis which we examine here.
If mutual fund management companies are in some sense
"selling" new information to mutual fund shareholders, we might look
for compensation arrangements which would reflect this fact. Since the
value of a specific bit of information remains constant regardless of the
size of the mutual fund, any given bit is worth less to each mutual fund
shareholder. as the total fund is larger. Thus, a given piece of
information, worth say one million dollars, results in a net
improvement of ten percent in a ten million dollar fund and of one
percent in a hundred million dollar fund. But as the new information
is used by a smaller fund, that fund naturally grows larger. The ideal
arrangement, therefore, would allow fund managers to be compensated
on the basis of growth of the fund up to a certain point and then to
switch over to compensation on the basis of total asset size. At that
point it would pay the fund managers to manage the enlarged fund
conservatively so as to give investors adequate diversification of risk
but no growth from actual new information. Any new information
would then be channeled into a new small fund, and the entire process
would be repeated time and again.
If this hypothesis is true, we should anticipate that smaller funds
generally would tend to be less conservative than large ones and figure
more prominently in the annual list of high performance funds. But we
should not anticipate many years repetition of high performance by any
one fund.
Every aspect of this hypothesis seems to conform to what we know
about the recent history of mutual funds.' The only problem with the
thesis is that it would hold true equally for fund managers who either
108. See Manne, Offshore and On-The SEC's Reach Threatens to Exceed its Grasp,
Barron's, Nov. 3, 1969, at I; Glenn, "Heads We Win . . ." Performance-Fee Mutual Funds
Have Had Their Ups and Downs, Barron's, March 2, 1970, at 5.
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"guessed" correctly about which stocks to buy or ferreted out their
solutions by so-called technical analysis. The latter hypothesis actually
seems easy to rule out since every study indicates the near impossibility
of succeeding in the stock market with this approach.109 The guess
hypothesis is a little more difficult, since obviously the moves of
guessers will be pretty much random-some will go in one direction
and others in another. Since there will be a successful and an
unsuccessful direction, some will win and some will lose. The winning
guessers will look just like the managers hypothesized to be using inside
information rationally. But there will still be ways of distinguishing the
two. A fruitful approach to this question, for instance, might be to
examine the performance records of new funds established by successful
managers of funds which have already become large. If a pattern
appears, and the same individuals consistently turn in a better
performance than others and tend to establish new funds over and over,
the indications would be very strong that the inside information
hypothesis is correct.
Success of mutual funds as a channeling device for information
may account for an even more specialized version of the same thing.
The so-called hedge funds began life, as their name implies, with power
to do more than simply buy and sell securities in the market. Although
hedging is normally thought of as a conservative, risk covering
operation, it came to stand for the actively trading, high risk, go-go
funds of the late 1960's. With only an insignificant exception or two,
all hedge funds have one important characteristic: they are all exempt
from SEC regulations under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
the Securities Act of 1933. Typically, the exemption from the 1940 Act
resulted from their having fewer than one hundred participants. But
one hundred offerees might still be sufficient to require a registration
under the Securities Act of 1933.110 Consequently, to avoid that result
the participants in these funds are typically important businessmen,
frequently the very individuals who might typically have access to
valuable information. It is quite possible that the hedge funds of the
sixties are very similar in their economic impact and operation to the
famous-now infamous-bull pools of the late twenties."' That is,
hedge funds may be nothing mcre nor less than efficient devices for
exploting information and exchanging its values among a select group.
109. See note 19 supra.
110. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 653-65 (2d ed. 1961); 4 id. at 2621-47 (Supp.
1969).
111. See ITSM,supra note 1, at73.
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In my book I argued that devices like discretionary accounts and
priority lists had become the post-SEC version of the bull pools
outlawed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. I also suggested that
the pools were actually a far more efficient device for exploiting new
information than were the other devices. Incidentally, I certainly should
have included in the list of devices limited partnerships in investment
banking houses, since frequently these were really invitations to share
in trading profits. There was, after all, a time when people thought that
reliance on Blau v. Lehman '12 was still safe.
But all of these practices are suspect today, mayhap because I
pointed out the possibility that discretionary accounts and related
.devices had obvious implications for insider trading. My hypothesis
about hedge funds would appear very strong if a simple survey (even
by the SEC) turned up the information that the increased participation
in hedge funds in recent years correlates with a steady decline in
invitations to invest in discretionary accounts or to become a limited
partner or in the use of priority lists by investment banking houses.
One caveat: I am not saying that every hedge fund was established for
the sole purpose of trading on inside information. Undoubtedly many
of them have been formed for other purposes. But it should be realized
that an occurrence, to be statistically significant, does not have to
appear in every possible case. Each cigarette does not produce lung
cancer.
A final and most interesting possible relationship between mutual
funds and insider trading occurs in connection with the rapid-expansion
of so-called off-shore funds. The phrase actually has no hard and fast
technical meaning. It refers generally to mutual funds established
outside of United States territory, largely investing in American
securities, operated by American managers but selling their fund shares
to foreign nationals only. These funds are outside the jurisdictional
ambit of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They are
technically corporations established under and domiciled in countries
other than the United States, and the mere fact that foreign
corporations may buy shares in American markets is generally not
considered sufficient to bring them under our regulatory jurisdiction.
My hypothesis is that the tremendous increase in the number of
such funds reflects efforts of fund managers to escape the American
law of insider trading. If the United States declares valuable
information a kind of contraband goods, it would seem most natural
112. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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to export it to countries where it is not illegal. Even during prohibition,
American whiskey barreled in bond was legally exported.
The growth in the number of off-shore funds can be explained very
simply by the increased popularity of such investments with foreign
nationals. But it would still seem peculiar, if that were the case, that
American managers would take such extreme precautions to avoid any
jurisdictional tie to the United States. Careful study of the identity of
the individuals actually managing these off-shore funds might reveal
interesting data. Until some evidence to the contrary is adduced, it is
at least a logical supposition that some of the movement off-shore has
simply been a device to export inside information in a fashion that
allowed American banking houses, through their brokerage operations
and the management of the funds, to profit by this device. The odd
thing, if this hypothesis is true, is that investors in foreign mutual funds
will be able to profit by information which American mutual fund
shareholders are prevented from enjoying. The irony is perhaps even
further compounded when it is realized that any strenuous effort by the
SEC to police this flow of information by curtailing off-shore
investment in American securities would probably meet with strong
objection on balance-of-payments grounds from the Treasury
Department.
VII. SHOULD WE Go BACK TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
One of the least irritating digs that I found in the various reviews
is that I want to turn the clock back, that I want to return to a period
of jungle warfare in the stock market, and that I want to erase the
moral gains which have been made in dealing with the financial enemies
of the public. I must demur and point out to my friends that, for
whatever reason, they have misstated my position. At no time did I
advocate a change in the law that existed as of the time my book was
written. The Texas Gulf Sulphur case had not been decided, even in the
district court, at the time I wrote, though it was decided approximately
three months before the actual publication date of the book. At that
point I did begin to advocate a change in the law. But up until that
point there was no rule against insider trading of the sort with which
I was dealing. Certainly it was not known that there was any liability
for someone who did not have a "special relationship"";' to the
corporation, nor was it known that there did not have to be "special
circumstances" creating some duty."'




Certainly there were commentators who proposed that courts
should decide the matter this way, but even they recognized that this
was not then existing doctrine."5 Nor did I advocate repeal of Section
16(b). On the contrary, I offered for the first time a reasoned argument
for that provision. I concede that I was not too concerned about it,
however, for the obvious reason that I did not and do not think that
the provision is effective in dealing with insider trading as I defined it.
I was extremely careful to state that I was not dealing only with
statutory insiders, that is, officers, directors or ten percent
shareholders. That would have been contrary to the very foundation of
my argument that there is a functioning market for information and
that unexploited information may get into the hands of anyone for a
variety of reasons before it is actually used in the market.
The real trouble, as I have said before, is that my critics are
confusing their ethical preferences with the law. What they mean when
they say that I was advocating a change in the law is that I was
advocating a rule (no mandatory prohibition on insider trading) which
violated their moral precepts of what federal law ought to be on the
subject.
Of course, they probably meant that my position was contrary to
the direction in which the law seemed to be moving. In this sense I had
proposed a change in what Adolf Berle has called the "inchoate"
law."' To this, of course, I must plead guilty. Had I not believed that
the law was heading in that direction, it would have seemed useless to
write such a troublesome book.
But I do not feel that my responsibility ends with predicting how
the courts will move. Nor do I feel obliged to flow along with the tide
of opinion. My effort was to give a rigorous analysis of a field that
had been treated in a most superficial, moralizing fashion. I still
maintain that such an approach violates the responsibility of serious
academics, to say nothing of the love feast so apparent between certain
law professors and a government agency. I find it very troubling to
hear a professor of law argue that "the SEC in its suit against Texas
Gulf Sulphur is entitled to escape the wise impatience with
administrative expertise which has appeared recently in the Supreme
Court and which suggests a new mood there."' 7 Such special pleading
on behalf of an agency which has never shown sincere interest in
115. E.g., Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. Rav. 1271 (1965).
116. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. LAW. 149 (1968).
117. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1478.
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utilizing economic expertise to analyze its own regulatory area is as
unseemly as it is incorrect. It is frustrating to be a minority of one
on any issue in the legal academic community. But it certainly would
be worse to be in the majority for the reasons that some members seem
to be there now.
